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Dr Michael Craft thought Sir Denis Hill's paper was very pessimistic. What he tried to do in his earlier contribution to the discussion was to suggest that if facilities were deployed to more effective use more would be got out of them. On the figures for London there were some 330 beds for subnormal children per million population. The figures he gave indicated that by schooling these children effectively, most could later do a job (in a sheltered workshop) when they left school, rather than continue within hospital. North Wales figures suggest 70 school places per million population for children with IQ 0 to 50, and 100 hospital beds. He would admit this was a higher figure than later might prove to be needed.
But a total of 170 places per million, for schooling and for the vegetative, was only half the provision now being made. He thought proper schooling would help to reduce the long waiting lists in London. Sir Denis Hill said that he had great admiration for Dr Craft's work, but his own anxieties were not on the financial side. It did not matter to him whether 20 % of the national budget was spent on medicine and the care of people; that was for society to work out. What did worry him was that at the moment, he did not see enough people of the right intelligence and education being motivated to come into this area of medical social care. As the proportion of people needed increased, he felt that there would be fewer and fewer people to do the job. That was what worried him, not the money.
Sanctity of Life
by Professor David Daube DCL Dr hon.c.Paris (All Souls College, Oxford) I propose to deal with three topics: euthanasia, abortion and the cost of expensive procedures.
Euthanasia
In normal conditions in modem countries, euthanasia for those hopelessly ill and threatened by unbearable suffering no longer constitutes a genuine problem. There are analgesics; and if the requisite dose is such as to speed death, the general consensus is, or will be shortly, that (except in special circumstances, e.g. where the patient dissents) it should none the less be administered.
Here let me say a word about the so-called double effect. Many Roman Catholics adopt a permissive stand on this point because the principal effect intended is the elimination of pain, while the hastening of death is merely a secondary effect regretfully put up with. It is often contended (for instance by Williams 1957,) that this construction may encourage hypocrisy; and no doubt the danger does exist, as in many comparable cases of moral distinction. But it may also encourage an enhanced consciousness of the precariousness of the action and, with it, of the limits beyond which you may not go. A doctor who simply asks himself whether it is better to kill the patient or not to kill him is more easily led to overstep them than one who asks himself whether, in the particular situation, it is his duty to relieve the pain even though it will kill the patient.
Admittedly, the very setting of limits is in pursuance of a value judgment, which may be disputed. None the less I regard it as an advantage to occupy a position which excludes, for instance, the despatching of the old who are not otherwise terribly afflicted.
By the way, 1 agree with the lusty octogenarian lady debater who protested against a fixed drawing up of age groups. I suggest that a young man is one whom a pretty girl can make happy or unhappy; a middle-aged man is one whom a pretty girl can make happy but no longer unhappy; and an old man is one whom a girl can no longer make either happy or unhappy. With women, it is quite otherwise. A woman's declining years are under 25: she rarely declines after.
Psychological and subtle indirect consequences appear to be frequently underestimated by the advocates of a wider application of euthanasia. For example, such a policy would surely undermine the relation of trust between patient and doctor. Admittedly, in an era of mass service and specialization, the old-fashioned personal intimacy is on the way out (except in the intensive units about which we heard this morning) and the majority of sick go to an organizationa firm, a hospitalrather than to an individual. None the less they go there confident that the staff into whose hands they surrender themselves are on their side, which means fundamentally, intent on curing them or helping them as far as possible this side of the grave. Once it got around that euthanasia was extensively practised, with whatever safeguards, people's feelings about the profession would undergo a considerable change.
(An Oxford doctor recently told me of a colleague of his who, in the first stage of cancer, extracted from the friend who treated him the promise to give him a fatal injection when things became bad. Things became bad, and the patient, frightened and suspicious, refused to have even the injections which would be ordinarily prescribed.) This aspect has a bearing also on the question of mercy-killing of the insane. Quite apart from other considerations, it would be a sad day when doctors came to be looked on as slayers.
An entirely different result which might follow if we relaxed the rules concerning euthanasia I have never seen mentioned". A person in an incurable and distressing state might well request euthanasia, not because he himself desires it, but from consideration for his family and friends: he would pretend that it was his true wish though in reality preferring life. I knew a great and wonderful man suffering from a terrible form of progressive paralysis. He would have been highminded enough, had law and usage permitted. it, to demand that he be killed in order to free those near him; and it would have been a grievous loss to his circle, including his wife and children who had no easy time. A friend to whom I put this replied that, since we expect a soldier in war to lay down his life for others, we may expect the same from one who has become a burden to his fellow-beings. I reject this analogy: war has its own necessity which we should not lightly carry over into a civilized society at peace.
Where the problem of euthanasia can still arise in its extreme form is in the absence of routine amenities and drugs; say, on the battlefield (and nowadays one has to add a bombed city) when 'It is discussed in my as yet unpublished Edinburgh Gifford Lectures, 'The Deed and the Doer in the Bible' medical aid is unavailable and the only way of alleviating intolerable pain of somebody mortally wounded is by shooting him. -This is not a dilemma specifically for medical ethics. Anybody may find himself confronted by it, and who will judge him for whichever decision he makes?
There are unfortunately other situations so outside normal experience that it is difficult to adhere to usual standards. A certain West German doctor, who elects to remain anonymous, during the last war, at fearful risk to himself, provided Jewish acquaintances about to be deported to torture and extermination with tablets so they could kill themselves. (He also for a while harboured a Jew and thereby saved him.) To be sure, to furnish the means of suicide is not quite the same as to kill; but suppose he had directly injected a paralysed Jew who was unable to handle the tablets or a small child? It would not detract from the nobility of his conduct'.
Abortion
One feature of abortion is that there is no relation of trust between doctor and foetus. In this respect, the situation is comparable to the treatment of an irretrievably unconscious person, a completely demented person, a baby or, in some countries, a slave. In all these cases, the doctor feels chiefly accountable to whoever is in charge, whose interests need not coincide with those of the immediate object of attention.
There are, of course, countless gradations between absolute nonparticipation and full status of the object. A child of 7 is more than a non-person. An inmate of an old people's home may enjoy less than unreserved recognition. I remember from my youth, when our maid fell ill and the doctorour doctorwas called in, he addressed himself to my mother. A reason some students keep away from the College doctor is that they impute to him divided loyalty. At all events, the potential conflict of interests between mother and foetus is obvious; and the doctor is caught between the two. It is arguable that the foetus is part of the mother's body; that any risk, burden and annoyance resulting from it has to be borne by the mother; that the ordinances, legal or ethical, for the safety of the foetus have been drawn up by men, at the expense of women; and that the mother should be entirely free to go on with or end her pregnancy. Yes, but the foetus is an 'It may interest readers that the concept of death as a release where a man is in the depths of misery first occurs in the apocryphal Book of Tobit (See Daube 1962) embryonic, emerging human being, if notas is held by some creeds, the Roman Catholic in particulara human being in the fullest sense. If you take the latter view, it must receive the same protection as any ordinary person; and even on the basis of the former, some measure of protection is warranted, though the precise degree is negotiable.
Roman Catholic teaching condemns abortion even where, without it, the mother perishes. This ruling has come under fire for being more rigorously opposed to the destruction of a foetus than to that of an ordinary man. A man about to kill another man may be killed himself if there is no alternative mode of preventing the deed; and he may be killed (Roman Catholic doctrine admits) not only if he is morally at fault, but even if, say, he is a lunatic. Yet a foetus about to kill the mother must not be removeda glaring illogicality, the critics maintain (see Williams 1957) .
The two cases, however, are not so completely alike. The argument was ventilated as long as sixteen hundred years ago. Jewish law allows or even reqbires destruction of a feetus in order to save the mother, up to the moment the child is born, that is to say, when the head is out. From this moment (and only from this moment) the Rabbis assume the existence of a full human being, of equal standing with any other. The question was raised in their ancient academies why, even at this stage, it should not be right to kill the child if otherwise the mother would die, seeing that the law authorizes the killing of a man about to kill another man, and authorizes it even if the attacker is a minor, not strictly answerable for what he does (Babylonian Sanhedrin 72b: see Jakobovits 1959) . This is exactly the modern argument, only they did not find it conclusive. Their answer was that the mother is attacked not by the child but from heaven; in other words, the child's presence is not comparable to an attack even by a minor or lunatic, it involves no doing on the child's part at all, the child is there, fatal to the mother by being there but not by any actionhence not to be sacrificed.
Historically and emotionally, the differences are indeed substantial. Where a man threatens to kill another man, in the vast majority of cases a moral wrong is committed; moreover, the emergency leaves no time for reflection, the instinct to rescue the prospective victim comes into instantaneous play. Against this background, it is small wonder that, if there is no other way out, even a deranged attacker may be killed. By contrast, in the vast majority of pregnancies, there is no danger to the mother's life and certainly no wrong; and where, exceptionally, grave risk does arise, in general a careful examination and weighing up of all factors can be undertaken. One may disagree with the Roman Catholic decision because of its very early dating of a human being (or even with the Rabbinic decision because it acknowledges a human being as soon as the head is through), but the charge of a senseless distinction cannot be upheld. I am hardly entitled to throw out three men from a full life-boat in order to rescue three struggling in the water. The former's presence does spell doom for the latter, but, in the words of the Rabbis, the attack emanates not from them but from heaven.
Where legal abortion is difficult to obtain and even where it is easy but at the price of social disapproval, inevitably the operation will often be performed in secret, in unhygienic conditions. As a result, there is much loss of life or health. A religion or morality which strongly insists on the protection of the unborn child must never lose sight of the very sad indirect consequences which are bound to occur. For a just and historically accurate appraisal of views on abortion, it is well to bear in mind that this dilemma is relatively novel. Prior to the revolutionizing of surgical hygiene in pursuance of Pasteur's and Lister's work, even expert intervention involved a high risk.
It is disgraceful that abortion should constitute a major problem in the second half of the twentieth century. By perfecting methods of birthcontroland even the pill is not yet anywhere near what is needed and possibleand by familiarizing people with them thoroughly and openly, the demand could be reduced to a fraction of what it is. There would remain a hard core of hard casesunexpected complications imperilling the health of the mother or the soundness of the offspringbut they would be few indeed. No doubt in an ideal world contraception would not be thought of. In the world as it is, it is infinitely preferable to abortion which is largely its substitute. I had written this paragraph when, by chance, two days ago, in West Germany, a report fell into my hands (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 June 1967, 'Natur und Wissenschaft', p 1): In the Federal Republic of Germany, in the four years 1963-6, while consumption of the pill and the use of other mechanical means of control went up, expectedly, the birth rate in the very same population also went up, quite unexpectedly. Here you are: contraception produces more babies. The explanation is (according to Professor H Harmsen, a Hamburg expert who has gone into it) that, as pregnancies can be planned, there is a steep fall in abortionespecially among married couples. I do not suppose it follows that the spread of enlightenment in India or Peru will enhance their fertility: the starting-point in those countries is different. (I would not mind if the paradoxical result did happen since, contrary to prevalent fashion, I feel the more the merrier.) What the development does dramatically confirm is the enormous dependence of abortion on failure of birth-control.
I must add a remark drawing your attention to a recent series of actions on account of wrongful life (see Tedeschi 1966) . They have cropped up in some half a dozen Western countries, Italy, North America, though not so far in Britain. A child will claim damages for being born under a handicap. He (or somebody on his behalf) may sue a parent for bringing him into the world illegitimate, or a parent, a doctor or the state for causing or allowing him to be born diseased. Actions of this nature have already succeeded and are bound to become part of modern law. An idea which has been mooted is an action by a deformed child on the ground that pregnancy was not terminated when his mother contracted German measles. If legislatures are not careful in correlating and synchronizing their various measures in this field, we may see one partner of a surgeons' firm fined for illegally operating on a woman with rubella, while the other has to pay up for wrongfully letting a woman with rubella bear a cripple.
Cost ofExpensive Procedures
Where the cost of treatment is borne by the patient, the limits are up to him. Even in this case complications arise, say, if he is mentally incapacitated through illness, senility or the like, and some prospective heir is waiting in the wings. Nowadays increasing importance attaches to the case where the cost falls on society. This problem is curiously intertwined with two others, that of commission and omission and that of discrimination. I have already indicated my view that it cannot be right for a doctor to commit a killing. The idiot or dotard kept by the state in an asylum or almshouse must not be put to death. On the other hand, the omission of life-saving measures where a person would be doomed to endless suffering not willingly borne is a different matter. A visiting professor in this connexion recentlycited from 'King Lear' the words spoken by Kent as the old man has at last fainted and young Edgar (Gloucester's son) wishes to call him back. Kent gently rebukes him: 'Vex not his ghost: 0, let him pass! he hates him That would upon the rack ofthis rough world Stretch him out longer'.' It would be interesting to know whether hyperrationalists who pooh-pooh the distinction between commission and omission would really sympathize to the same extent with a Kent who, the moment the king collapsed into a swoon, got hold of a syringe and finished him off.
There is, of course, omission and omission; in other words, besides the all-important distinction between active commission and passive omission, we have further to differentiate between omission of the usual, routine steps and omission of a farfetched special intervention. Refraining from feeding an unconscious person comes nearer the action of killing than does refraining from giving him insulin. It is, as so often, a matter of gradation. A gynacologist told me that a woman gave birth to a monster, two heads or something of the sort. He simply omitted the normal measures and the unfortunate being, whose death would in any case have taken place within a week or so, died almost immediately. The course he took was definitely preferable to giving a fatal injectionif only because once the doctor embarks on this method, his outlook is apt to become less unreservedly constructive, which in turn, as I pointed out earlier on, will affect the attitude of his clients.
The situation which, for a variety of reasons, is at the moment receiving a great deal of attention is where a patient can be kept alive and free from pain, indeed, happy and active, yet only at high cost to the community. Naturally, the community may have to choose between the particular therapy and alternative communally financed objectives: defence, education, free lunches for the poor, or, within medicine, other therapeutic tasks. What is worse for the individual doctor, a choice may have to be made between patients since provision for all is not attainable. This means discriminationagainst those who must be rejected.
Clearly, there is no question of killing these latter: it is inherent in the case that all that "'King Lear' V, iii (see Louisell 1966) . Professor Louisell is injecting a slight dose of modernism when he introduces these lines as concerned with 'artificial prolongation of life at whatever cost in pain and economic resources'. Economics is hardly in Kent's mind. it is noteworthy, incidentally, that as Lear faints, the exclamation 'Break, heart; I pr'y thee, break!', generally attributed to Kent who strongly feels that death would now be a blessing fox his king, is given in the Quartos to Lear himself. Here, therefore, Kent has the king's express authority for his discouragement ofresuscitation happens is omission of quite extraordinary manceuvres which would save them. That this is sad, even terrible, cannot be denied. But so long as the selection is based on no outrageous standards, doctors should not worry too much. By all means let them work out guide lines or set up committees if they think there are ways of ensuring a high degree of fairness. They can only do their best, and it would be wrong to make them have a bad conscience for what is ultimately not their doing; on the contrary, they would be the first, if entrusted with drawing up the State budget, to increase the means at the disposal of medicine.
Should a person's usefulness to society be a criterion? I am aware of the vagueness and fluctuating meaning of this term. I find women of greater service than men, but some of my colleagues feel the converse. There is a ship-wrecked party: two Italians and an Italian woman, two Frenchmen and a French woman, two Englishmen and an English woman and two Russians and a Russian woman. These twelve are stranded on a desert island. By the third day the following situation has developed. One of the two Italians has murdered the other and has settled down with the woman. The two Frenchmen have come to an amicable arrangement and have settled down to a menage I trois. The two Englishmen have murdered the woman and have settled down. And the three Russians have drafted a letter to Moscow asking for instructions. Let us be down to earth and understand usefulness as the unsophisticated citizen would: a young scientist or housewife with children, over against a retired shoeshine man. It will inevitably be one consideration, though we may well hold that it ought not to be the only one. But it would be hypocritical to pretend that it is not a touchstone constantly applied throughout the world in all areas of private and public commerce, and even where it affects life and death. A plane in which a VIP travels is better serviced than one for common passengers; and I certainly feel much safer when I travel together with Lord Cohen.
This does not mean that a doctor should become an agent of the government, in the sense of subordinating his task as a healer to the interests of the State. It merely means that we allow him to be human. None of us can or should free himself entirely from contemporary ideas as to the public good; and, for instance, a long-continued clamour about overpopulation is bound to have a certain effectan adverse one -on the valuation of an individual life. To some extent, fortunately, this is counterbalanced by the great novel possibilities of fighting death. Experience shows that techniques develop their own momentum: if a brilliant method of curing cancer is available, doctors want to use it no matter how many people to a square mile.
Incidentally, the danger of a doctor becoming the instrument of an administration is not new. Besides such institutions as compulsory notification of certain diseases, where the patient's wishes may have to be flouted, medical ethics has strangely neglected the province of forensic medicine. One can think of business in this branch directly bearing on the issue of the sanctity of life that I am discussing. What about the doctor employed to certify the death of a criminal executed? Or one who by his expert testimony brings a criminal to the gallows? Or, under our present system, to life-long incarceration? This is a puzzling outgrowth of medical art.'
As a layman, it is proper for me to stress the cost of some therapies to the doctor. A few weeks ago I passed through an American city. I had lunch with friends from Classics and Law, and we were joined by the professor of surgery. Excellent, un-American wine was produced. I noticed that the surgeon declined it and as I knew him to be healthy and fond of good food and drink I questioned him. It turned out that there was a baby in his hospital with kidney trouble. He could be kept alive for some six months, within which it was hoped to find a kidney that might be given him. If a suitable kidney offered, the transplantation would have to be performed without delay. So the professor kept in continuous touch with the hospital and radically abstained from alcohol. That man, a twentieth-century version of St Francis, did not pause to enquire into food-production per head of population or the gain or loss to the body politic. The baby needed him.
I conclude with a quotation:
'It is doubtful if many doctors who actually care for the sick and the infirm plan their actions on the basis of the predicted effect upon society. Instead, the dominant tradition is for the physician to provide the best care of which he is capable for those who either seek his services or who are assigned to his responsibility; by and large this is done without regard for the conceivably broader issue of whether or not treatment is justifiable on social grounds. His reasons may include pride, altruism, compassion, curiosity, a spirit of competition, even avarice, or a combination 'The dilemma of a doctor who, during a war of which he disapproves, has to train students for medical posts in the army is not fundamentally different from that of anyone called on to do a job which furthers the war effort; though, understandably, a doctor may see a greater inconsistency than, say, a tax inspector between his calling and war of all these things. Whatever the motive, the reflexes which follow are sure, and respond similarly to the needs of the productive members of the community, the insane and feeble-minded, children with incurable birth defects, condemned criminals, or even soldiers who moments before were members of a hostile army.
'The foregoing viewpoint is a narrow one, but there is no reason to believe that it should be abandoned in the face of advancing technocracy. It has shielded the ill from the caprices of the moral judgments of other men through centuries of evolving philosophical, religious and legal doctrines. It has placed the concept of the sanctity of human life on a practical foundation, since the responsibility of one person for another could not be more clearly defined than through the doctor-patient relationship, irrespective of the reasons for the contract entered into between the two involved parties.' This quotation is taken not from some poetical Utopia, but from an exposition by one of the great young surgeons of our day, a leader of progress, practising and teaching in a very modem, successful country, the United States (Starzl 1967) .
Accipio omen: I eagerly accept his statement as presaging the future pattern of your noble profession.
